Complete volumes of the Washington Law Review, dating back to Volume 1, Issue 1 (June 1925),
are available in the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library
.
Volume 85
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Issue 4
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November 2010
When Your Body is Your Business
Morgan Holcomb; Mary Patricia Byrn
85 Wash. L. Rev. 647 (2010)
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Full Article
Surrogacy in the United States is a multi-million dollar industry in which well paid professionals seek out specially qualified women to fill the difficult job of being a surrogate. Surrogates enter lengthy contracts in which they agree, in intricate and intimate detail, to provide a service for significant compensation—as a group, surrogates in the United States are paid well over $22 million per year. This Article argues that surrogates are professionals in this for-profit industry and are required to report surrogacy compensation as income. As a corollary, surrogates may deduct most of their surrogacy related expenses as business deductions. Being a surrogate is a highly personal service and the expenses the surrogate incurs—such as for maternity clothes or medical care—are typically treated as nondeductible personal expenses, but when your body is your business, the personal is business.
The Terrorist Informant
Wadie E. Said
85 Wash. L. Rev. 687 (2010)
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Full Article
A man sets himself on fire in front of the White House in a dispute with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He has been working as an informant for the FBI in a high-profile terrorism prosecution and is unhappy with the $100,000 he has been paid so far. He has also been recently convicted of bank fraud. As a result, the government declines to call him as a witness, given the damage his actions have on his credibility and trustworthiness. This incident underscores the difficulty inherent in relying on paid informants to drive a prosecution, where material considerations such as money and legal assistance are often the price the government pays for an informant’s services. In the years since September 11, 2001, informants have been at the heart of many major terrorism prosecutions. The entrapment defense, perhaps the only legal tool available to defendants in such prosecutions, has proven ineffective. This is evident when one considers the context of generally heightened suspicion of the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States. Further, a closer look at several of these prosecutions reveals repeated instances of suggestive and provocative activity by informants geared at obtaining a conviction, calling into question whether a genuine threat to U.S. national security actually existed in the first place. This Article argues that the government should cease its current practice of using informants to generate terrorism prosecutions.
Article I, Section 11: A Poor 'Plan B' for Washington's Religious Pharmacists
Noel Horton
85 Wash. L. Rev. 739 (2010)
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In Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, a group of Washington pharmacists contended their religious beliefs precluded them from dispensing the drug Plan B, a post-coital emergency contraceptive. They based their argument on rights conferred by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. A United States District Court found in the pharmacists’ favor and enjoined enforcement of rules issued by the Washington State Board of Pharmacy requiring pharmacies to deliver medications. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erroneously applied a heightened level of scrutiny to a neutral law of general applicability. Interestingly, the pharmacists did not bring a claim under the Washington State Constitution, a document that has been interpreted to confer greater protection for free exercise rights than the U.S. Constitution. This Comment argues that even under the Washington State Constitution’s heightened protection of free exercise, the pharmacists’ position in Stormans would ultimately fail. The Board’s rules protect public health and accommodate individual religious objections, thereby satisfying the Washington State Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test.
No Direction Home: Constitutional Limitations on Washington's Homeless Encampment Ordinances
Jordan Talge
85 Wash. L. Rev. 781 (2010)
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Full Article
The Washington State Constitution protects the free exercise of religion. It also vests strong police power in local governments. When these two constitutional provisions conflict, the Washington State Supreme Court must draw the line between valid police power action and impermissible burden on free exercise. In City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, a municipal government crossed that line. The City of Woodinville, Washington refused to consider a church’s application to host a homeless encampment. The Court held this outright refusal to be an unjustified infringement on the church’s free exercise of religion. The Court did not, however, articulate permissible steps a municipality could take to regulate homeless encampments on church property. Absent further guidance on the appropriate reach of homeless encampment ordinances, religious organizations and municipalities lack clarity in hosting and regulating these sites. More than a dozen municipalities in Washington have taken action to regulate temporary homeless encampments, and legal challenges surrounding these encampments are likely to persist. This Comment applies the Washington State Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test to municipal homeless encampment regulations, distinguishing valid exercises of police power from undue restrictions on religious free exercise.